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1. Facts
This case (Mexico – Antidumping Measures on Rice)1 concerns the manner in
which dumping margins should be calculated for exporters who have not been
individually examined during the investigation process. Mexico imposed anti-
dumping (AD) measures on US exporters of beef and rice to its market. It did not
take any particular steps in order to identify all exporters ; it limited itself to an
investigation of US exporters identiﬁed in the petition, as well as of US exporters
who voluntarily presented themselves to the Mexican authority. Mexico imposed
the highest individually calculated margin on all ‘unknown’2 US exporters, that is
on all US producers who had not been investigated and exported beef and rice to
the Mexican market in the years following the imposition of antidumping duties.
The United States (US) protested. In its view, Mexico should have applied the
residual rate (that is, a duty corresponding to the average individual dumping
margin found, as opposed to the highest individual dumping margin found) to all
noninvestigated exporters, and not the highest duty, as it did.3
The Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) did not explicitly disagree with the
United States, but did not uphold its arguments either. The Panel found that the
Mexican authority should have pursued the investigation more actively, whereas
the AB found against Mexico because it used wrong data.
The Panel and the AB also entertained claims on the manner in which Mexico
chose the period of investigation (POI). Although this was not the core issue of the
dispute, we consider it necessary to discuss the relevant ﬁndings since this is an
1 WTO Doc. WT/DS295.
2 We will use the terms unknown and unidentiﬁed as synonyms throughout this paper.
3 The US government was de facto defending its own practice.
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area where case law is still evolving and the legislative guidance is quite open-
ended. Mexico arbitrarily (that is, without any justiﬁcation) restricted the months
in each calendar year during which it investigated the existence of dumping and
injury; it also used data that were 15 months old. Both the Panel and the AB
condemned the use of POI chosen by Mexico.4
In Section 2, we discuss the claim concerning the duty that unidentiﬁed
exporters should be paying. Section 3 deals with the claims on POI. Section 4
introduces economic considerations, and Section 5 concludes with a speciﬁc
recommendation to improve the process of AD investigation.
2. Who are the dumpers?
2.1 A brief discussion of the legislative framework
Before, we examine the case, an introduction to the issue is necessary for two
reasons:
(a) the facts are highly complicated;
(b) the AD Agreement accepts on the one hand that dumping is private business
practice, but allows countrywide AD orders;
(c) at the same time, the AD Agreement does not adequately deﬁne who should
be investigated when countrywide AD orders are imposed. State practice
has evolved in a nonlinear manner in this respect.5
Since dumping is private practice, an investigating authority will have to identify
a source of supply and calculate an individual dumping margin. Because, on the
other hand, there is at least an implicit suspicion that all other private entities
originating in the same country might be dumping as well, an investigating
authority might be calculating dumping margins for more than one exporter.
4 The AB entertained a third claim on the permissibility of using assumptions during an investigation.
The claim was upheld since Mexico was found to be violating the requirements of Arts. 3.1 and 3.2 AD to
base its ﬁndings on positive evidence, on procedural grounds. This was a side issue brieﬂy discussed and
better explained in other case law. This is why we decided not to discuss it in detail. For the record,
however, we mention that the AB acknowledged that, within the bounds of this discretion, an in-
vestigating authority may be expected to rely on reasonable assumptions or draw inferences. In doing that,
it must ensure that its determinations are based on ‘positive evidence’. Although it is not impermissible to
use assumptions, these assumptions should be derived as reasonable inferences from a credible basis of
facts, and should be suﬃciently explained so that their objectivity and credibility can be veriﬁed. WTO
members (through their investigating authorities) who use a methodology premised on unsubstantiated
assumptions are ipso facto violating Art. 3.1 AD. An assumption is not properly substantiated when the
investigating authority has not explained why it would be appropriate to use it in the analysis. Mexico, in
the Final Determination, did not explain why the assumptions on which the investigation relied upon were
appropriate and credible in the analysis of the volume and price eﬀects of the dumped imports, or how
they would contribute to providing an accurate picture of the volume and price eﬀects of the dumped
imports (··204–205).
5 As we will argue later in this Section, this is one case where there is need for legislative amendment in
order to avoid similar problems in the future.
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If there are many sources of supply identiﬁed, the investigation could be hampered
in case each one of them was to be investigated: in such cases, an investigating
authority can investigate only a sample, and apply a residual duty on all non-
investigated exporters (following thedisciplines enshrined inArts. 6.10and9.4AD).
Finally, new exporters (considered shipments), that is producers who originate in
the country being investigated and who did not export during the investigation
process, will undergo an expedited review when they start exporting to the country
that has AD duties in place against imports from the country at hand.
Assuming producers have been sampled, the AD Agreement suggests that only
two rates of AD duties are permissible:
(a) an individually calculated duty for all sampled exporters and all other
exporters who have come forward and requested to be investigated;
(b) the weighted average of the individually calculated duties will be applied to
all other sources (originating in the same country).
In case no sampling took place, individual dumping margins will be imposed on
all investigated exporters. The AD Agreement does not explicitly allow authorities
to investigate only some exporters in a nonsampling scenario. This is, nevertheless,
what happened in the present case : Mexico did not sample; it calculated dumping
margins for those investigated, and then imposed the highest margin on all non-
investigated exporters.6 The Agreement does not explicitly regulate this trans-
action. Besides investigated exporters, the AD Agreement regulates the dumping
margins to be imposed on one more category of exporters : new shipments (Art.
9.5 AD). With respect to new shipments, as brieﬂy alluded to above, the AD
Agreement requests that an individually calculated duty be imposed, but is silent
on the amount of default duty (assuming one is WTO consistent), that is the duty
that they have to pay until a review has been initiated. There are good arguments
to support the thesis that new shipments have to pay a duty until their review has
been initiated. The obligation included in Art. 9.5 AD (to start an expedited review
of the duty imposed on products coming from new exporters in order to calculate
an individual duty for such new exporters) implies as much. The context of Art.
9.5 AD makes this conclusion inescapable. Art. 9.5 AD talks of products on which
duties have been imposed, and the need for expedited review on new shipments. If
no duties were in place, why should the review be expedited? Actually if no duties
were in place on new shipments and the review was expedited, new shipments
would have been enjoying a less favorable regime than old shipments that proﬁted
from a normal investigation. This could raise MFN issues. It is legally impossible
that the law is illegal, and the task of the interpreter is to interpret it in a manner
that all provisions retain their scope. It seems to us that to do that, we must
6 Hence, the US claim that Mexico should have imposed the weighted average on noninvestigated
exporters has no basis in the AD Agreement. There is an obligation to impose the weighted average on
noninvestigated exporters only in case an authority has sampled exporters.
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presume that the new shipments are burdened by duties before the expedited
review takes place. Then comes the question of the duty to be applied to un-
identiﬁed exporters, assuming for the time being that such exporters, who were
exporting during the period of investigation, can exist. It seems that, in principle,
the only existing possibility,7 assuming a willingness to impose duties, is that such
exporters come under the purview of Art. 9.5 AD. There is an inconvenience,
however: the wording of Art. 9.5 AD seems to suggest that it covers only cases
of exporters who were not exporting the product at hand during the period of
investigation. Hence, an extension to cover producers that were exporting such
product is arguably contra legem.
It could be, of course, that some exporters originating in the same country (with
the exporters being investigated) are not known to the authority. They could be
unknown for a variety of reasons: because they managed to hide (let us call this,
uncooperative behavior), or because the authority did not take any reasonable
eﬀorts to identify them (for example, they continued to export and were never
requested to appear before the authority), or for other reasons as well. With
respect to such unknown exporters, that is exporters who were exporting to the
country investigating at the time the investigation takes place but for whatever
reason were not identiﬁed during the investigation process, the AD Agreement is
silent as to how much duty they should be paying, assuming they should be paying
at all. We know, nevertheless, that such exporters are liable to pay duties since
countrywide orders are perfectly GATT consistent : WTO Members can lawfully
impose duties on all producers originating in the country of the dumper (Art.
9.2 AD).
Two questions thus emerge:
(a) First, what is the extent of the obligation imposed on the investigating
authority to identify exporters?
(b) Second, the related question, assuming that there is no obligation to identify
all current exporters (that is, with the exception of new shipments), what is
the amount of duty to be imposed on unknown exporters?
2.2 Speculating about the responses
Art. 6.10 AD, we recall, requests determination of individual dumping margins for
all known exporters. The same provision allows for sampling of exporters, in case
their number is large. The nonsampled exporters will pay a duty in accordance
with Art. 9.4 AD (weighted average). The term known exporters is nowhere
deﬁned in the AD Agreement. Let us take the sampling scenario ﬁrst : one way to
understand this provision is that sampling will occur only after all exporters have
been identiﬁed. Assuming this is the correct interpretation, there will be no room
7 As we argued before, Art. 9.4 AD cannot be functionally put into operation, absent knowledge of all
exporters.
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for unknown exporters, but only for new shipments (i.e., producers who did
not export during the POI). The upshot of this approach is the elimination of
the third category (unknown exporters). The downside is that this might incite
strategic behavior on behalf of the investigating authority and might push up
AD duties : an investigating authority will have the incentive to investigate
individually those dumpers that, in its view, might be credited with the largest
dumping margin and thus impose a high weighted average on the rest. Is there
insurance policy against this risk? Yes, in principle : nonsampled producers who
believe they dump less, or do not dump a lot, will come forward and ask to be
individually investigated. The investigating authority can, nevertheless, thwart
such requests pointing to the nonpracticability of a marginal investigation (Art.
6.10 AD).
Art. 6.10 AD could also be understood as meaning that, following a ﬁrst review
of the ﬁle, it appears that there are dozens of exporters. The investigating authority
does not go all the way and identify all exporters. It does investigate a sample of
those identiﬁed (although, not a sample of all exporters), and imposes a weighted
average on all other exporters, identiﬁed or not. Here, there is room for unknown
exporters, but it does not matter. Known nonsampled and unknown exporters
alike, will pay the weighted average duty, as per Art. 9.4 AD.
A variant of this latter approach would distinguish between known nonsampled
and unknown exporters : the former would pay the weighted average, and the
latter something else. This is the EC approach, which is not challenged in the
present dispute.
Does the Agreement privilege one over the other approaches? The Agreement
is unclear. There are good arguments though, supporting the view that the
negotiators had in mind the ﬁrst and/or the second scenario, but not the third: Art.
6.10 AD states that a statistically viable sample must be investigated. This term has
a particular meaning in statistical analysis and would require an active research
by the investigating authority. The same provision, however, waters down this
concept by adding that the sample should be statistically viable on the basis of
information with the investigating authority. This last sentence could be a simple
truism (how could it be otherwise? The investigating authority can judge only
upon information it possesses), or could be understood as diluting the obligation
imposed: it is not a statistically viable sample that must be investigated, but a
statistically viable sample of the exporters known to the investigating authority.
Depending on the number of known exporters, the number could be quite low.
By the same token, Art. 6.10 AD requests from authorities to investigate the
largest percentage of the volume of exports that can reasonably be investigated.
Criteria such as administrative capacity could be quite relevant in quantifying this
obligation.
And what about cases, like the one before us, where no sampling took place?
Once again, an investigating authority must impose individually calculated
dumping margins on known exporters (Art. 6.10 AD). Does this provision also
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entail that it must identify all exporters? There are good arguments in favor of this
thesis. One could plausibly, for example, argue that the sampling scenario should
be reserved for cases where there are dozens of exporters, and the nonsampling for
cases where the number of exporters is limited. In that latter case, the investigating
authority should be responsible for calculating individual margins. The counter-
argument here would be: what if an exporter is hiding during the investigation
process? How credible is this counterargument? Recall that those hiding will pay
the residual duty anyway in the US, and a higher duty in other markets (such as
Mexico, or the EC). So, they would have little incentive to hide in the ﬁrst place.8
And how credible is it that they can hide in a scenario where only few exporters
exist? The importing state could check the relevant data, and identify the sources
of supply to its market one by one. This is more or less what the Panel, as we will
see, requested from the Mexican authority to do.
To recap: sampling should be reserved to cases where it is not manageable to
investigate individually all exporters ; in other cases, individual margins must
be calculated for all. Hence, if at all, unknown exporters will exist only in case
sampling has taken place. There should be no room for unknown exporters in the
nonsampling scenario: those that hide and do not export during the POI will be
treated as new shipments ; those that continue exporting but do not present
themselves to the investigating authority will be detected through cooperation
between the customs authority and the investigating authority. If their number
is not large, they will be individually investigated; in the opposite scenario, the
investigating authority can perfectly well proceed and sample.9
Let us see now how all these issues were addressed by the AB in the report under
discussion.
2.3 The AB approach
In the past, the AB has, on a number of occasions, revealed a preference in favor of
an active investigating authority. InMexico – Antidumping Measures on Rice, the
Mexican investigating authority had limited its investigation to two US exporters
identiﬁed by the petitioner, and two that had motu proprio presented themselves
to the Mexican authority. The Panel held the view that the Mexican investigating
authority violated its obligations by not making a reasonable eﬀort to identify
exporters other than the four mentioned above. In the case at hand, the Panel felt
8 Only assuming that they dump more than other exporters, and they know that this is indeed the case,
they would still have this incentive to hide. But, even in this case, they would have no incentive to hide if
they export to Mexico or the EC.
9 Recall that for this approach to be workable, cooperation among two governmental functions, cus-
toms authorities and AD investigating authority, is required. This might prove a daunting task for some
developing countries. Note also, however, that the size of this problem should not be overstated: ﬁrst,
many developing countries, active users of the system, like Mexico, for example, have eﬃcient customs
authorities. Second, all that is required to communicate from one agency to another is information about
the origin of the goods, a rather trivial issue.
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that one could reasonably expect that it is incumbent upon an active investigating
authority to look for some easily available information.10
The AB disagreed, but probably ended up with a similar, if not more ambitious,
result. For a start, it held, following a completely textual interpretation of Art. 6.10
AD, that the term known exporters appearing in Art. 6.10 AD does not include
exporters that the investigating authority should have known when the investi-
gation was initiated (·255). As a result, the term known exporters is limited to
exporters identiﬁed by the petitioners and exporters who voluntarily identiﬁed
themselves to the investigating authority. By inference, unknown exporters are not
only those covered by Art. 9.5 AD (that is, new shipments : exporters who were not
exporting during the investigation), but also those who were exporting during the
investigation but were not identiﬁed (either by the petitioners or voluntarily).
The next question before the AB was whether the AD Agreement imposes any
limits on the amount of the duty to be paid by unknown exporters (who are not
considered new shipments). Recall that the AD Agreement is silent on this score.
US practice11 suggests that, indeed, the residual rate (weighted average) of the
individually established dumping margins should be applied to new shipments, as
well as other unknown exporters. The Panel was not convinced by this argument.
In ·7.159 it developed its rationale for rejecting this argument. We quote from
·7.159:
The US argument that the placement of this provision immediately preceding
Article 9.5 of the AD Agreement dealing with new shipper reviews implies that its
rules also apply to non-shipping exporters is not convincing, as we do not ﬁnd
that anything can be deduced in and of itself from the sequence of provisions
in the Agreement, particularly when the provision in question relates to an
exceptional situation, while the subsequent provision does not. The United States
also argues that the non-sampled interested parties and the new shippers dealt
with by Article 9.5 are in a similar position and that by analogy the same Article
9.4 methodology for the calculation of a residual duty rate should apply. We are
not convinced that the text of the Agreement supports this view. In this respect,
10 US exporters were being identiﬁed in a commercial publication that was before the Mexican in-
vestigating authority.
11 It bears repetition that the US scheme is contra legem : the US authority applies the residual duty
even in case of nonsampling, when the AD Agreement clearly reserves the possibility to apply a residual
duty for cases where sampling has taken place. EC practice, as brieﬂy alluded to above, suggests another,
residual, rate that applies to imports from unknown or new exporters : exporters that are not new shippers
and kept quiet during the investigation, or exporters that remained unknown during the investigation, the
reasonable eﬀorts of the EC authority to identify them notwithstanding, will see their exports burdened
not with the weighted average, but with a residual rate. Assume that the EC authority has sampled three
exporters who ship equal volumes to the EC market, and that they are found to be dumping by 10%,
20%, and 30% respectively. The EC authority will impose the duties mentioned above to the three
investigated exporters; a 20% (weighted average) duty on all identiﬁed exporters; and a 30% (residual)
rate on nonidentiﬁed exporters as well as on new shipments. It seems that the EC higher duty for unknown
exporters is reserved for cases when sampling has taken place. The consistency of such practice with the
multilateral rules has not been established as yet.
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we ﬁnd particularly relevant, the absence of any cross-referencing in Article 9.5
of the AD Agreement dealing with new shippers to the calculation methodology
of Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. This absence of cross-referencing is
particularly conspicuous if one were to accept, arguendo, the analogous situation
of non-sampled and non-shipping exporters. Indeed, especially in such a situ-
ation, one would expect the drafters to have explicitly referred to Article 9.4 of
the AD Agreement. As on other occasions, where the drafters intended to see
obligations apply in similar circumstances, they explicitly provided for such
cross-referencing. We recall in this respect that the Appellate Body also found
that the absence of such cross-referencing to obligations contained in other pro-
visions is revealing of the absence of such an obligation. We ﬁnd that Article 9.4
of the AD Agreement does not refer to non-shipping exporters outside a sampling
situation, and that there was therefore no obligation for the Mexican authorities
to calculate a residual duty margin for Producers Rice based on the ‘neutral ’
methodology set forth in Article 9.4 of the AD Agreement. We therefore reject
the US claim in this respect. (Italics in the original).
The above-cited passage suggests that an investigating authority, when imposing
duties on shipments coming from new exporters does not have to apply a duty
equivalent to the weighted average. This does not mean that, if it does so, it will be
violating the AD Agreement. The question, nevertheless, remains what is the
maximum permissible duty under the circumstances?12
In Mexico – Antidumping Measures on Rice, the AB did not take a clear stance
on the issue. Indirectly, however, it provided some answers. The AB did state
that an authority is not permitted to impose a residual duty rate based on facts
available. According to the AB, an authority that imposes a duty on unidentiﬁed
exporters based on facts available, including facts from the petition, is acting in
violation of Art. 6.8 and paragraph 1 of Annex II AD. We quote from ··259–260:
The second sentence of paragraph 1 of Annex II conditions the use of facts from
the petitioner’s application on making the interested party ‘aware’ that, if the
information is not supplied by it within a reasonable time, the investigating
authority will be free to resort to these facts available. In other words, an
exporter shall be given the opportunity to provide the information required by
the investigating authority before the latter resorts to facts available that can be
adverse to the exporter’s interests. An exporter that is unknown to the in-
vestigating authority – and, therefore, is not notiﬁed of the information required
to be submitted to the investigating authority – is denied such an opportunity.
Accordingly, an investigating authority that uses the facts available in the appli-
cation for the initiation of the investigation against an exporter that was not
given notice of the information the investigating authority requires, acts in a
manner inconsistent with paragraph 1 of Annex II to the Anti-Dumping
Agreement and, therefore, with Article 6.8 of that Agreement.
12 The Panel, in its report on Mexico – Antidumping Measures on Rice, did not have to address this
issue.
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_
The United States exporters that Economı´a did not investigate were not notiﬁed
of the information it required. Notwithstanding this, Economı´a used facts
available contained in the application submitted by the petitioner against these
uninvestigated exporters.
According to the AB, putting exporters on notice that facts available will be used
is a precondition for the use of facts available. This condition, for obvious reasons,
can never be met in the case of unidentiﬁed exporters: one cannot notify the person
that has not been identiﬁed.
The AB addressed a situation in which the residual rate was based on petitioner
data, and was particularly adverse when compared to the margins of dumping
calculated for the examined (known) exporters. But the need to inform exporters
of the fact that, in the absence of cooperation, facts available will be used, applies
in all cases, and not only when the data used are provided by the petitioner. To a
certain extent, any margin based on information other than data provided by the
exporter itself is based on ‘facts available’. Logically speaking, the AB’s statement
could thus be read to imply that no residual duty can be imposed on such unknown
exporters. A rate based on the highest margin of an exporter individually calcu-
lated, as is the EC’s practice, is also a facts-available rate for the noninvestigated
exporter, and hence, in this line of thinking, would, as well, be WTO inconsistent.
If this reading is correct, the AB eﬀectively closed the door to the possibility that
unknown exporters exist when no sampling has taken place: since recourse to
Art. 6.8 AD is impermissible in such cases, the investigating authority must
identify all nonsampled exporters.13
To conclude on this score, the AB responded in the following manner:
(a) there is no obligation for the investigating authority, in a nonsampling
scenario, to identify all exporters ;
(b) an investigating authority cannot use facts available against nonidentiﬁed
exporters ;
(c) it follows that an investigating authority must calculate individual dumping
margins in this respect ;
(d) in this line of logic, the maximum duty for nonidentiﬁed exporters will be
the duty that will be individually calculated.
So let us take a real-world example and see how the AB ﬁnding holds. In
the instant case, Mexico identiﬁed only four exporters and calculated dumping
13 A very imaginative reading of the AB Report could lead to the conclusion that all the AB wanted to
say was that facts available which are adversemay not be used to calculate a duty for unknown exporters.
There remains a serious problem: when is the use of facts available (not) adverse? Is a residual duty based
on the highest margin found for an investigated exporter less adverse than the use of information con-
tained in the petition? Is a lesser duty (for example, weighted average) not so adverse? If this was the true
intention of the AB, it could simply adhere to the position advanced by the US lawyers during the liti-
gation. It did not.
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margins for each one of them. Days or weeks later, a ﬁfth exporter, who was
exporting during the POI, exports to Mexico. Mexico must calculate a dumping
margin for this exporter, since it cannot use facts available (data from the
four exporters already investigated). Since this exporter is not considered a new
shipment, Mexico cannot conduct an expedited review either. So, in this reading,
Mexico must pay the price (assuming there is a price to pay) for not having actively
investigated the transaction before it, and identiﬁed all exporters. Recall that
nothing stops Mexico from sampling, in case it realizes during the investigation
process that the number of exporters is quite large.
On the other hand, one could make the argument that all the AB wanted to say is
that facts available (Art. 6.8 AD) will not be used against nonidentiﬁed exporters
in a nonsampling scenario. What else, however, could be used? How could the
Mexican authority impose duties on nonidentiﬁed exporters that it does not
individually investigate without having recourse to the information it gathered by
investigating the US exporters for which an individual dumping margin had been
calculated? All the Mexican authority knows is the amount of dumping margin for
those individually calculated. If it cannot use it through Art. 6.8 AD on non-
identiﬁed exporters, the only provision it might have recourse to is Art. 9.5 AD. Is
that what the AD had in mind? Is the AB’s view that nonidentiﬁed exporters
should be considered new shipments? If yes, then the AB has eﬀectively extended
the coverage of this provision to transactions not envisaged by the legislator: recall
that this provision covers cases of producers who were not exporting during the
investigation period, and not cases of producers who were exporting but were not
identiﬁed during the investigation process.
To conclude: the AB does not request from the Mexican authority, in a non-
sampling scenario, to actively investigate all exporters. It does not allow it to use
facts available against nonidentiﬁed exporters either. The only reasonable con-
clusion under the circumstances is that, if Mexico does not ask the right questions,
it will have to pay the price.
3. The period of investigation (POI)
3.1 The issues raised
The complainant raised two issues:
(a) it complained that Mexico chose only the six months every year (in the
three-year investigation period), where import penetration was high. It thus
ignored the other six months every year where the domestic industry fared
better. As a result, the comparison was unfair. Mexico replied that it chose
the same months for dumping and injury investigations, otherwise the
comparison would be unfair ;
(b) it further complained that Mexico used 15-month-old data. Such data
were inappropriate in light of the changes that occurred ever since.
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Mexico replied that these are the best data it could have used under the
circumstances.
3.2 The legislative framework
The AD Agreement does not regulate the length of the POI. It imposes a require-
ment for fair comparison (Art. 2.4 AD), but falls short of imposing speciﬁc
obligations as to the choice of POI. State practice has moved in to ﬁll this gap. State
practice, however, is not completely uniform, although elements of overlap are
quite substantial. Over the years, WTO Members have, in the context of the
Committee on Antidumping Practices (ADP), managed to reach some common
understanding on the requirements for an appropriate choice of POI. However,
two points are appropriate in this context: ﬁrst, the ADP recommendations do not
constitute an exhaustive treatment of the POI, since many questions are still open;
second, the legal value of an ADP recommendation is an open issue.14
The Panel Report in part relies on the ADP Committee recommendation on the
length of POI to support its view as to the length of the injury POI (·7.62).15 The
use of ADP recommendations in this limited manner proved useful. The ADP
recommendation, however, was of no use when the Panel and the AB tried to
address the two questions asked by the complainant.
3.3 Some months every year_
Recall that the United States claimed that the AD Agreement had been violated
because the Mexican authority had analyzed only six months’ worth of data for
each of the three years of data collection. Mexico asserted that it was necessary to
examine these particular six months of every year instead of the full year in order
to ensure that the period of the injury analysis paralleled the six-month period
chosen for the analysis of dumping, so as to avoid any distortions.
The Panel saw no a priori reason why a period of investigation on the
injury analysis should be chosen to ﬁt the period of investigation for the
dumping analysis in case the latter period of investigation covers a period of
less than 12 months, as there is nothing in the AD Agreement that would require
such an approach; quite to the contrary, in its view, was true.16 The Panel con-
sidered that the choice of the period of investigation is crucial, as it determines
the data that will form the basis for the assessment of the impact of dumping,
and that an examination or investigation can only be ‘objective ’ if it is based
14 In general, there is nothing like a clear statement by anyone (legislator or adjudicator) as to the legal
value of WTO secondary law. It seems safe to argue, however, that they constitute an interpretative
element of the primary law since they have been used as such by Panels so far.
15 By the same token, previous reports, such as the Panel Report on EC – Pipe Fittings, have used a
recommendation by the ADP Committee as a source of law to reach its conclusion that it is desirable that
the period for dumping investigation and for injury determination substantially overlap (·7.321).
16 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.82.
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on data that provide an accurate and unbiased picture of what it is that one is
examining.17
Mexico chose a three-year POI, and restricted its investigation into the six
months for each of the three years. In fact, Mexico upheld the POI proposed by the
petitioner (interested, of course, in seeing AD duties imposed). In the Panel’s view,
for Mexico to legitimately restrict the POI in this manner, it would have to provide
some justiﬁcation why this was necessary in order to perform a fair comparison.
Mexico did not do that. In fact, the only element before the Panel was the US claim
that the six months chosen were the months of high import penetration. In the
absence of justiﬁcation for the restriction, the Panel condemned the Mexican
choice in the following manner:
In sum, we ﬁnd that the injury analysis of the Mexican investigating authority in
the rice investigation which was based on data covering only six months of each
of the three years examined, is inconsistent with Article 3.1 of the AD Agreement
as it is not based on positive evidence and does not allow for an objective
examination, as it necessarily, and without any proper justiﬁcation, provides only
a part of the picture of the situation. In addition, we ﬁnd that the particular
choice of the limited period of investigation in this case was not that of an
unbiased and objective investigating authority as the authority was aware of, and
accepted, the fact that the period chosen reﬂected the highest import penetration,
thus ignoring data from a period in which it can be expected that the domestic
industry was faring better.18
The AB agreed that these two factors – the selective use of the information
gathered and the fact that the authority accepted the POI proposed by the
petitioner, knowing that the petitioner proposed that period because it allegedly
represented the period of highest import penetration – plus the absence of any
justiﬁcation explaining why the use of data from the remaining six months would
distort the picture, were suﬃcient to conclude that the data used by the Mexican
authority did not provide an accurate and unbiased picture (··181ﬀ.).
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd fault with the AB on this score. The data used seem to suﬀer
from selection bias (assuming that it is factually correct that the six months chosen
are those of the highest import penetration, a fact that Mexico has not disputed).
Such data cannot provide the input for a proper evaluation of the dumping margin
and the ensuing injury.
3.4 How old can data be?
The United States further claimed that the Mexican authority had used a POI for
injury that ended more than 15 months prior to the initiation of the investigation.
17 Panel Report,Mexico – Anti-DumpingMeasures on Rice, ·7.79. The Panel added, however, that its
ruling should not be read as to imply that there could never be any convincing and valid reasons for
examining only parts of years. Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.82.
18 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.86.
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The Panel considered that while the AD Agreement does not contain any speciﬁc
and express rules concerning the period to be used for data collection in an anti-
dumping investigation, this does not mean that the authorities’ discretion in using
a certain period of investigation is boundless.19 The Panel was of the view that
there is necessarily an inherent real-time link between the investigation leading to
the imposition of measures and the data on which the investigation is based.
In spite of the fact that an antidumping investigation out of necessity relies on
historical data gathered during a past POI, such information should be the most
recent information reasonably available :
Of course, it is well established that the data on the basis of which this determi-
nation is made may be based on a past period, known as the period of investi-
gation. Nevertheless, because this ‘historical ’ data is being used to draw
conclusions about the current situation, it follows that the more recent data is
likely to be inherently more relevant and thus especially important to the
investigation. This, as a consequence, implies that the data considered concerning
dumping, injury and the causal link should include, to the extent possible, the
most recent information, taking into account the inevitable delay caused by the
need for an investigation, as well as any practical problems of data collection in
any particular case.20
This led the Panel to the following conclusion:
The requirement of a time-consuming and sometimes complicated investigation
to demonstrate the existence of dumping and the ensuing injury poses a practical
impediment to a complete identity in time between the imposition of the measure
and the conditions for such imposition, i.e. dumping causing injury. Although
this practical problem may lead to the situation in which any determination of
dumping causing injury has by the time of the imposition of the measure become
more of a proxy than a real time assessment of the current situation, it would, in
our view, not be correct to be led by the practical necessity to examine the past to
assess the present to accept that an investigating authority could justiﬁably base
itself on old data to the exclusion of more recent data which was available and
usable. To the contrary, the fact that an investigation of up to 12 months may
have to be conducted to determine dumping, injury and the causal link magniﬁes
the importance of having a period of data collection which ends as closely as
possible to the date of initiation, as by the time of the possible imposition of the
measure another 12 months may have passed.21
The Panel thus considered that a 15-month gap between the end of the period of
investigation and the initiation of the investigation is suﬃciently long as to impugn
the reliability of the period of investigation to deliver, for the purposes of a
determination, evidence that has the requisite pertinence or relevance, thereby
19 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.57.
20 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.58.
21 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.63.
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failing to meet the criterion of ‘positive evidence’ pursuant to Article 3.1 AD.22
The Panel did not state that the AD Agreement imposed a requirement not to use
15-month-old data. It did interpret the Agreement, however, to impose a require-
ment to at least explain why, in case such data have been used, it still adequately
explains the state of aﬀairs when the imposition of AD duties is being decided.
Mexico failed to do that.
Note that, in order to reach its conclusion, the Panel once again relied on the
ADP recommendation on POI which, in pertinent part, states that that the period
of data collection should end as close to the date of initiation of the investigation as
is practicable.23
The AB fully upheld the reasoning of the Panel.24 It emphasized the fact that the
determination of whether injury exists should be based on data that provide
indications of the situation prevailing when the investigation takes place, because
the conditions to impose an antidumping duty are to be assessed with respect to
the current situation. Mexico’s failure to explain why historical data could still
appropriately explain the state of aﬀairs when duties were imposed was critical in
the AB’s ﬁnding.25
Here too, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd fault with the attitude of the AB. Even in the
absence of clear language to this eﬀect, it is illogical to interpret the AD as allowing
for imposition of duties based on historical data. The wording of Art. 11.1 AD is
highly pertinent here: duties shall be in place as long as necessary to counteract
injury caused by dumping. A necessary precondition is that injury is being caused
at the moment when duties are being imposed. Knowledge that injury is being
caused as a result of dumping can only be based on data that prove that this is
indeed the case. There should be a presumption that this is indeed the case when
the data used are as close as possible to the date when the imposition of duties
is being decided. Older data could also suﬃce assuming that the investigating
authority can prove that nothing has changed ever since.
The AB did not go all the way and establish a reversal of the presumption in case
older data have been used. It would be hard to implement such a proposal as a rule
of thumb since it is far from being an easy exercise to come up with an age for
permissible and impermissible data that will make sense across transactions.
Implicitly however, this is what its ruling amounts to. In fact, all the United States
proved in this context was that the data were 15 months old. It suﬃced for the
22 Panel Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·7.64.
23 Before the AB, Mexico complained that the Panel wrongly relied on the ADP recommendation. The
AB rejected Mexico’s argument, holding that the Panel relied on the recommendation only to conﬁrm its
own interpretation. This view seems to suggest that reliance on such instruments as a means to conﬁrm
already adopted interpretations is legally correct in the AB’s view. If yes, this would ipso facto lead to
classiﬁcation of such elements as supplementary means of interpretation (in the sense of Art. 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
24 AB Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ··163–172.
25 AB Report, Mexico – Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice, ·165.
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Panel and the AB to reverse the burden of proof and request from Mexico to
respond why such data were still appropriate.
4. The problem lies with the law, not the judges’ ruling
With respect to the POI, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd fault with the rulings by the AB. We
will thus focus on the treatment of unidentiﬁed exporters. The AB seems to have
limited the risk of abusing the investigation process by outlawing recourse to facts
available in a nonsampling scenario. The AB, nevertheless, cannot undo the
intrinsic inadequacies of the AD Agreement. The AB can, at best, try to rationalize
aspects of the AD Agreement, while maintaining the balance of rights and
obligations struck by the principals themselves, namely the WTO Members. In
fact, however, the problem with the AD Agreement goes much deeper than the
lack of clarity with respect to the treatment of unidentiﬁed exporters. It relates to
whether it is countries or ﬁrms that are responsible for dumping and that should
pay AD duties if they engage in injurious dumping. In what follows, we advance
some thoughts on this issue, and argue that a fundamental incoherence must
be removed from the AD Agreement, whereby it considers dumping as private
practice on the one hand, and presumes that dumping is a countrywide practice on
the other. If this incoherence remains, we risk seeing many other dumping cases
being brought before the WTO adjudicating bodies. Our arguments, therefore, go
beyond the present case by suggesting what we consider as a necessary legislative
amendment to the AD Agreement.
Dumping is a pricing strategy whereby producers in one country charge lower
prices in foreign markets than in their home market. As such it is practiced by
ﬁrms, not countries. Yet Article 2 AD deﬁnes dumping in terms of countries with
no reference to individual ﬁrms:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a product is to be considered as being dumped
i.e. introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal
value, if the export price of the product exported from one country to another is
less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like
product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.26
This deﬁnition would seem to imply that the pricing strategy of all exporting
ﬁrms of a particular product is identical, with the same price diﬀerential between
the home market and the importing country for all relevant ﬁrms. This, obviously,
makes little or no economic sense. There is no a priori reason to believe that two (or
more) ﬁrms behave identically in terms of their pricing in diﬀerent markets simply
because they happen to produce the same product in the same country – unless
they operate under perfect competition in the home- and in the importing-country
markets.
26 Art. 2.1 AD, emphasis added.
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If perfect competition prevailed, it would be hard to understand how dumping
could occur altogether. Since dumping is a form of price discrimination, it requires
that ﬁrms be able to set prices in the diﬀerent markets rather than take them as
given, as it is the case under perfect competition.
If markets were perfectly competitive, the ‘ law of one price’ would prevail and
all identical products would have only one price – at least within the same geo-
graphical or national market. However, perfect competition is clearly an extreme
case that is unlikely to prevail in many circumstances, and therefore ‘the ‘‘ law of
one price ’’ is no law at all ’ in fact.27
There are essentially two reasons why the ‘law of one price’ does not hold. The
trivial reason is that products may not be identical either because they are diﬀer-
entiated or because diﬀerences in the services oﬀered by competing ﬁrms might
lead them to charge diﬀerent prices for the same product. But even if products are
truly homogenous, price dispersion is likely to be the rule rather than the exception
to the ‘law of one price ’. As Nobel Laureate George Stigler argued more than 40
years ago, price dispersion is related to the existence of imperfect information and
search costs of consumers.28
Product diﬀerentiation and imperfect information imply that ﬁrms might be able
to exert some degree of market power and hence to price discriminate. Moreover,
diﬀerent ﬁrms can be expected to face diﬀerent circumstances and to have diﬀerent
capabilities that result in diﬀerent costs and therefore diﬀerent prices – unless they
operate under perfect competition in which case prices have to be the same for all
ﬁrms and the diﬀerent costs simply translate into diﬀerent proﬁts.
The AD Agreement actually recognizes in two places that ﬁrms which produce
the same product in the same country do not necessarily behave identically. The
ﬁrst acknowledgment of this comes in Art. 5 AD on antidumping initiations and
investigations, where the Agreement states that applications to national authorities
by the domestic industry in the importing country for antidumping measures must
contain:
a complete description of the allegedly dumped product, the names of the
country or countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known
exporter or foreign producer and a list of known persons importing the product
in question.’29
Furthermore, Art. 6 AD on evidence in antidumping investigations states that:
The authorities shall, as a rule, determine an individual margin of dumping for
each known exporter or producer concerned of the product under investigation.30
27 Varian (1980: 651).
28 Stigler (1961). See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006).
29 Art. 5.2, emphasis added.
30 Art. 6.10, emphasis added.
320 PETROS C. MAVRO ID I S AND ANDR E´ SA P IR
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745608003698
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 21:53:23, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
In other words, the Agreement makes it clear that each ‘known exporter
or foreign producer’ must be identiﬁed and that the national authorities must
determine individual dumping margins for each of them. There is no question of
lumping them all together and assuming that they behave identically.
However, as already discussed supra, there are two possible interpretations of
the expression ‘known exporter or foreign producer ’. One interpretation is to
consider that only those exporters or producers from the country concerned who
have been identiﬁed by the domestic industry in its application for AD measures
have potentially engaged in injurious dumping. The other interpretation is to treat
all exporters or producers from that country as if they potentially engaged in
injurious dumping, and to treat those identiﬁed by the domestic industry in its
application as a special subset of exporters or producers.
Art. 6 AD contains no indication as to which of the two interpretations is
favored by the Agreement. However, Art. 9 AD on the imposition and collection
of AD duties contains some language dealing with another category of ‘unknown’
exporters, those who were not exporting to the importing country during the
period of investigation but did so later on, which provides the necessary clue:
If a product is subject to anti-dumping duties in an importing Member, the
authorities shall promptly carry out a review for the purpose of determining
individual margins of dumping for any exporters or producers in the exporting
country in question who have not exported the product to the importing Member
during the period of investigation, provided that these exporters or producers can
show that they are not related to any of the exporters or producers in the
exporting country who are subject to the anti-dumping duties on the product.
Such a review shall be initiated and carried out on an accelerated basis, compared
to normal duty assessment and review proceedings in the importing Member.31
Hence any exporter or producer of a product and from a country subject
to AD duties is to be viewed as potentially engaging in injurious dumping in
the importing country, if it exported to the importing country after the period
of investigation. A fortiori the same must hold for exporters or producers who
exported to the importing country during the period of investigation.
The interpretation chosen by the Agreement implies that all ﬁrms producing the
allegedly dumped product in the country in question engage in injurious dumping,
unless proven otherwise. It puts, therefore, the burden of proving innocence on all
exporters, both those who are ‘known’ and those who are ‘unknown’.
It could perhaps be argued that this interpretation of the Agreement rests not
only on Art. 9.5 AD, but also on the language in Art. 6 AD itself.
The text of the Agreement states that:
All interested parties in an anti-dumping investigation shall be given notice of the
information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in
31 Art. 9.5 AD.
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writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in
question.32
The Agreement also states that interested parties include:
(i) an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to
investigation, or a trade or business association a majority of the members of
which are producers, exporters or importers of such product.33
These two statements could be interpreted as saying that national authorities in
the importing country must investigate all exporters or producers of the allegedly
dumped product from the exporting country subject to investigation. This would
imply that, indeed, they are all considered potentially guilty of injurious dumping.
Such reading of Art. 6 AD is reinforced by the statement that:
In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not
provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or signiﬁcantly
impedes the investigation, preliminary and ﬁnal determinations, aﬃrmative or
negative, may be made on the basis of the facts available. The provisions of
Annex II shall be observed in the application of this paragraph.34
In other words, all interested parties must participate in the investigation, and
those who refuse may be subject to AD duties.
Whatever the exact legal basis for the interpretation chosen by the Agreement,
the fact of the matter is that it runs counter to economic rationality. The
correct economic interpretation would have been that ﬁrms producing the same
product in the same country will typically behave diﬀerently because they face
diﬀerent economic conditions and because perfect competition does not hold.
Such interpretation would have implied that investigating authorities should not
presume that all ﬁrms engage in injurious dumping simply because some might or
even do.
This leads us to conclude that the Agreement is internally inconsistent from an
economic viewpoint. On the one hand, the Agreement supposes that all exporters
or producers of an allegedly dumped product who produce in the country in
question are potentially guilty of injurious dumping in the importing country. On
the other, it recognizes that diﬀerent exporters or producers may behave diﬀer-
ently and should therefore be subject to diﬀerent treatment in terms of AD duties.
Hence, with respect to the fundamental question of the burden of proof and,
ultimately, whether it is countries or ﬁrms that should be held responsible for
dumping, nothing short of a revision of the AD Agreement itself can be satisfactory
from an economic viewpoint.
32 Art. 6.1 AD.
33 Art. 6.11 AD.
34 Art. 6.8 AD.
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5. Lock the case law
The AB advanced an interpretation of the AD Agreement that seems to move
dumping back to the realm of private practices, as it should be, and away from
unprovable conspiracy scenarios on which the Agreement itself in part rests. By
outlawing recourse to Art. 6.8 AD in the case of nonsampling, the AB eﬀectively
imposes a duty on national investigating authorities to establish individual
dumping margins for all exporters, instead of presuming that they all dump in
the same manner simply because of their common origin. This is one (small) step
forward, and it would be desirable, indeed, to lock it somehow. Although the
lawmaking function of the AB is highly disputed, it is probably advisable to pro-
ceed ﬁrst in the context of the ADP Committee and secure a Recommendation35
that would repeat the AB ﬁndings and clarify that investigating authorities:
(i) are under the duty to identify all exporters in a nonsampling scenario;
(ii) must calculate individual dumping margins for each exporter.
By the same token it would be helpful to also clarify issues (legitimately) not
touched upon by the present case, such as:
(i) the fact that nonsampled exporters are not liable to pay duties until a
review takes place;
(ii) the nature of such a review (whether it should be expedited or not) ;
(iii) the amount of duty to be paid by new shipments.
The fundamental problem that we have identiﬁed in this paper is the unjustiﬁed
presumption that all producers originating in a country must be dumping because
one of them does; it must be taken care of through legislative amendment.
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